Matthew D. Vandermyde, Arms Embargoes and the Right of
Self-Defense in International Law
I. INTRODUCTION
The law on self-defense in international law is the subject of the most fundamental
disagreement between states and between writers.1 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the
starting point for any self-defense analysis, states that: “Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council2 has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.”3 There is considerable debate over many aspects of
the Article, including the significance of the word “inherent,”4 the significance and definition of
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the phrase “armed attack,”5 and the definition of “measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.”6
The uncertainty of self-defense law is magnified when considering its relationship with
Security Council action. One argument that has gained popularity over the past few decades is
that mandatory arms embargoes imposed against a nation by the Security Council may violate the
nation’s right to self-defense.7 The International Court of Justice8 has yet to make a
determination on the issue. The Security Council has listened to the arguments and, in some
instances, has responded by adjusting the embargo to exclude its application to arms destined for
the government, such as in the Rwanda and Sierra Leone conflicts.9 In other instances, however,
the Security Council has rejected the argument and refused to lift or adjust the embargo.10
This article will attempt to clarify and assess the validity of self-defense arguments in the
face of mandatory arms embargoes by exploring the sources, content, and legal status of right of
self-defense,11 analyzing the substance and success of previous arguments,12 and reconciling the
competing policy interests.13
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II. THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
In order to understand the role the Security Council’s actions play in determining and
affecting the right of self-defense, it is necessary to first examine the current state of the right
itself and its origins.
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations provides, in relevant part: “Nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”14 There are those who argue
that the word “inherent” in Article 51 is merely a “theoretical opinion of the legislator which has
no legal importance.”15 They argue that “the meaning of Article 51 is clear; the right of selfdefense arises only if an armed attack (French: aggression armée) occurs.”16 They believe that
“[t]he limits imposed on self-defence in Article 51 would be meaningless if a wider customary
law right to self-defence survives unfettered by these restrictions.”17
However, it is generally accepted that “the right to self-defense is ‘inherent,’ at least in
the sense that Article 51 of the Charter does not impair the pre-Charter customary right of self-
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defense.”18 Those who support this wider right of self-defense argue that at the time the U.N.
Charter was written there was a wide customary right of self-defense that allowed the use of
force not only in response to an armed attack, but also to protect nationals and in anticipation of
an armed attack.19

A. The “Inherent” Right of Self-Defense
1. Self-defense in Customary International Law
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes “international
custom” as a source of international law.20 The term “international custom” in Article 38(1) is
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commonly called “customary law”21 and “results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”22
The general practice necessary for a custom to become international law does not need to
take place over a long period of time. It may be of “comparatively short duration.”23 But the
practice must be “general and consistent.”24 It may be “general even if it is not universally
followed; there is no precise formula to indicate how widespread a practice must be, but it should
reflect wide acceptance among the states particularly involved in the relevant activity.”25
The sense of legal obligation necessary for a practice to become international law is
called opinio juris sive necessitates, or just opinio juris.26 A practice that is “generally followed
but which states feel legally free to disregard does not contribute to customary law.”27 It is
generally difficult to determine when such a conversion into law occurs.28 “Explicit evidence of
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Id. Some commentators take issue with opinio juris in a couple of ways. See George Norman
& Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 A.J.I.L. 541 (2005). First,
commentators wonder whether customary international law can ever come into existence if it
requires a sense of legal obligation before it can exist. See id. at 544. Second, commentators
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a sense of legal obligation (e.g., by official statements) is not necessary; opinio juris may be
inferred from acts or omissions.”29
The right of states to defend themselves, which has been “defined as ‘a lawful use of
force (principally, counterforce), under conditions prescribed by international law, in response to
the previous unlawful use (or, at least, the threat) of force’”30 has been recognized for thousands
of years, dating at least back to the Roman era.31 It is a “concept common to all legal systems.”32
There is no doubt that each state acknowledges its own right to defend itself, and similarly,
acknowledges the legal right that other states have to defend themselves. This acknowledgement
creates a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris. Accordingly, the right of self-defense is
universally accepted as customary international law.33 This conclusion is further bolstered by
analyzing other sources that contribute to the development of customary law.

2. Sources That Contribute to theEstablish ment of the Right of Self-defense
as Customary International Law.
There are a number of other factors thatplay a role in the establishment of self-defense as
international customary law, including, but certainly not limited to, natural law, judicial
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decisions, and U.N. resolutions. A brief description of each is important to an understanding of
how the law continues to develop.

a. Natural Law
It has been suggested that natural law principles greatly contribute to the establishment of
customary law, including the right of self-defense.34 Natural law is best defined by the words of
Marcus Tullius Cicero written over2,000 years ago:
True law is right reason in agreement with nature. It is of universal application,
unchanging and everlasting . . . It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to
attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. It cannot be
changed by majority. There will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different
laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all
nations and all times. There will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over all of us, for
he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge.35
Natural rights are those rights that are derived from natural law. 36 In the international
law arena, some theorists, starting with renowned Dutch Republic jurist Hugo Grotius in the 17th
century, have argued that “self-preservation is an inherent right of both individuals and states and
is an integral part of defining ‘just war.’”37 “The right of self-defence . . . has its origin directly,
and chiefly, in the fact that nature commits to each his own protection.”38 Self-preservation, as a
34
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natural right, could not be abrogated or even limited by positive law.39 Perhaps the United
Nations Charter reflects this in characterizing self-defense as an "inherent right."40

b. Judicial decisions
Judicial decisions in international law are not really “sources” of law as they are in United
States domestic law.41 “They are not ways in which law is made or accepted, but opinionevidence as to whether some rule has in fact become or been accepted as international law.”42
Additionally, Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states: “The decision
of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular
case.”43 That reflects “the traditional view that there is no stare decisis in international law.”44
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But see Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade, 14 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 845, 865-66 (1999) (“not everyone agrees that Article 59 is concerned with the precedential
effect of decisions. Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen of the ICJ does not locate the rule against
stare decisis in Article 59, declaring this provision ‘has no bearing on the question of precedents.’
This disarming statement rests on two quite plausible claims. First, a literal parsing of the
language of Article 59 indicates it is meant ‘to ensure that a decision, qua decision, binds only
the parties to a particular case.’ That is, the language is limited to defining the legal relations of
the parties . . . but having nothing to do with whether a decision can serve as a precedent in
subsequent litigation . . . . Judge Shahabudeen’s second argument begins with the observation
that Article 38.1(d) refers to decisions of tribunals other than the ICJ, whereas Article 59 refers
only to the ICJ’s decisions. Suppose Article 59 was a rejection of stare decisis. Then, it would
be a rejection only for ICJ decisions. In contrast, Article 38.1(d) expressly countenances the use
of judicial opinions as a subsidiary means of uncovering the meaning of international law. Judge
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However, “in the few permanent courts, such as the International Court of Justice, the Court of
Justice of the European Communities, and the European Court of Human Rights, there is
considerable attention to past decisions.”45
The International Court of Justice has recognized that the right of self-defense is rooted in
customary law, and is not in someway superseded by the U.N. Charter:
[T]he Court observes that the United Nations Charter, the convention to which
most of the United States argument is directed, by no means covers the whole area
of the regulation of the use of force in international relations. On one essential
point, this treaty itself refers to pre-existing customary international law; this
reference to customary law is contained in the actual text of Article 51, which
mentions the "inherent right" (in the French text the "droit naturel") of individual
or collective self-defence, which "nothing in the present Charter shall impair" and
which applies in the event of an armed attack. The Court therefore finds that
Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a "natural" or
"inherent" right of self-defence, and it is hard to see how this can be other than of
a customary nature, even if its present content has been confirmed and influenced
by the Charter.46
c. U.N. Resolutions
i. Security Council Resolutions
United Nations Security Council Resolutions are binding on all parties to the United
Nations,47 and also take precedence over any other international agreement.48 They contribute to

Shahabuddeen suggests the result would be that opinions from tribunals other than the ICJ might
well have a status higher than ICJ opinions.” (quoting MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT
IN THE WORLD COURT 63, 99-101 (1996))).
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the development of customary law because the binding nature of the resolution enhances the
opinio juris, or the sense of legal obligation on the part of the states. Additionally, the
resolutions provide good evidence of existing customary law because the votes of Security
Council members act as “formal state expressions” of opinio juris.49
The Security Council, in theory, should always be able to pronounce whether a claim of
self-defense is justified, but in practice it is very difficult to do so.50 The difficulties that the
parties have in establishing the facts in cases involving a claim of self-defense and the legality of
the use of force are especially apparent in recent International Court of Justice cases Cameroon v.
Nigeria (2002)51 and Iranian Oil Platforms (2003).52 “The issue is left unresolved in the vast
majority of cases; certainly the Security Council does not generally make express
pronouncements determining this crucial legal issue . . . it is far more common for this to take the
48

U.N. Charter art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”).
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John Alan Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the Emerging Norm of Anticipatory Self-Defense in
Customary International Law, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 283, 295 (2003). For example,
commentators suggest that the United States has enunciated the doctrine of anticipatory selfdefense through its conduct in foreign relations. Id. Particularly, “the voting patterns of the
United States in the U.N. Security Council . . . are formal state expressions of opinio juris on the
practice at issue.” Id.
50
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2002 ICJ LEXIS 4. This was primarily a boundary dispute, but Cameroon also claimed that
Nigeria had used illegal force, including an invasion of Lake Chad in 1987, and attacks into the
Bakassi peninsula. Nigeria claimed that any use of force had been in self-defense. Both parties
presented extensive arguments on the use of force, but the Court effectively avoided a decision
on the claim of self-defense GRAY, supra note 1, at 96 n.5.
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States to use force in self-defense. Id.

10

form of a call for a cease-fire rather than any attribution of responsibility.”53 Members of the
United Nations see the Security Council’s goal as “the promotion of the restoration of peace
rather than as the assignment of responsibility.”54 Furthermore, attempts to pronounce the
validity of self-defense claims are often defeated by veto.55
However, in two recent cases, the Security Council has upheld a state’s claim of selfdefense.56 In the 1980-88 Iran/Iraq conflict, Iran persistently claimed that Iraq was responsible
for initiating the conflict, and the Security Council as ked the UN Secretary-General to investigate
responsibility.57 The Secretary-General accepted and reported that Iraq contravened international
law through the illegal use of force and disregard for the territorial integrity of Iran when it
attacked Iran on September 22, 1980.58
Also, in the 1990 Iraq/Kuwait conflict, the Security Council explicitly upheld Kuwait’s
right to self-defense when attacked by Iraq.59 These pronouncements may mark “a new role for
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Id. at 97. The United Charter assigns to the Security Council the primary responsibility to
maintain international peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 24(1).
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FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II 47-48 (1997).
59
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border disputes and oil production disputes. DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORIT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER 68 (2001). After the UN could
not convice Iraq to withdraw, more than 20 nations participated in Operation Desert Storm which
forced Iraq out of Kuwait. Id. at 68-71.
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the Security Council and the start of a new legal order.”60 Hence, in this respect, the customary
international law of self-defense may begin to become more clear.

ii. General Assembly Resolutions
Although United Nations General Assembly resolutions are not binding, they provide
good evidence of developing customary law because adoption requires votes of the states
themselves.61 It is often difficult, however, to determine what weight should be afforded the
resolutions.62
In many cases where the Security Council was unable to pronounce the validity of selfdefense claims, they were considered by the General Assembly, “which, unfettered by the veto,
generally condemned the alleged self-defense action as a Charter violation.”63 However, the
target states generally do not accept the General Assembly decisions as binding.64
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See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 769 (2001); Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §103 cmt. c. (1987); Cohan, supra note 49, at
296. The General Assembly is made up of all 191 member nations. Press Release, List of
Member States, U.N. Doc. ORG/1360/Rev. 1 (Feb. 10, 2004). Important General Assembly
decisions, including recommendations regarding the maintenance of international peace and
security, are made by a two-thirds majority of members present. U.N. Charter art. 36. Decisions
on other matters are made by majority. Id.
62

See Roberts, supra note 61, at 763.
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Schachter, supra note 33, at 264. For example, the General Assembly condemned the U.S.
bombing in Libya after a similar Security Council resolution failed. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 38, U.N.
GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 34, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/53 (1986)
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3. Self-Defense As A Jus Cogens Norm
There is little dispute that there are “certain peremptory norms within international law.
The use of the term peremptoryis to classify these norms as ones from which no state can
derogate.”65 Such norms form a body of jus cogens.66 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention
describes the criteria necessary for a norm to become jus cogens: 67
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character. 68
The principle of jus cogens not only invalidates treaties, but also actions of states and
international organs that derogate from it.69

65

Carin Kahgan, Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right to Self-Defense, 3 I.L.S.A. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 767, 769 (1997).
66

Id. at 771.

67

Article 64 of the Vienna Convention provides further that “[i]f a new peremptory norm of
general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm
becomes void and terminates.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
68

Id. at art. 53. Many believe that natural law was the cornerstone to the establishment of jus
cogens, and that it remains today as an element of jus cogens. See G.M. DANILENKO, LAWMAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 250 (1993). Jus cogens differs from natural by
definition, however, in that a jus cogens norm can be changed by “a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character,” but natural law is “unchangeable” and is “valid for
all nations and all times.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980); CICERO, supra note 35, at 33.
69

See, e.g., Scott, supra note 18, at 106-13. Examples include slavery, genocide, and torture.
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law:
A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 840 (1997).
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There is some difficulty, however, in determining whether the right of self-defense rises
to the level of jus cogens.70 To the extent that a Security Council’s action “derogates” from a
peremptory norm, and therefore violates jus cogens, the action would be rendered unlawful.71
Because no derogation is permitted from a jus cogens norm, and Article 51 seems to limit
(and hence derogate from) the right of self-defense, by definition it seems to naturally follow that
the right of self-defense could not be a jus cogens norm.72 But this notion is easily refuted
intratextually. A nation’s right to defend itself, regardless of whether that right is rooted in
customary law, natural law, or is a jus cogens norm, is conditioned upon necessity.73 If it is not
“necessary” to use force in self-defense, there is no right to use force in self-defense. Article 51
merely provides that: “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense . . . until the Security Council has taken measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security.”74 Once the Security Council has taken “necessary”
measures to protect the victim party, it is no longer “necessary” for the state to use unilateral
force in self-defense. Hence, Article 51 is not a limit on self-defense but rather an articulation on
the natural limits of self-defense.75
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See id. at 57; see also, e.g., Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., A Concept of International Law:
Protecting Systematic Values, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 197, 234-37; KELSEN, supra note 15, at 791;
Kahgan, supra note 65, at 791.
71

See Int’l L. Comm’n Report, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, p. 89 (1966).
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See Scott, supra note 18, at 58.
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30 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 193 (1843), reprinted inJennings, The Caroline and
McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 89 (1938).
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U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added).
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See infra Part II.B.3. Though Article 51 also contains the phrase “if an armed attack occurs,” it
cannot seriously be argued that a state may not use necessary and proportionate force against
aggression that does not amount to an “armed attack.” See U.N. Charter art. 51; see infra Part
14

Self-defense can be shown to be a jus cogens norm by considering the legal status of its
counterpart, the prohibition on the use of force.76 Article 2(4) states that: “All members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.” 77 There is an inextricable linkage between this prohibition on
the use of force and the right to use defensive armed force when that prohibition is violated, and
each can only be defined in relationship to the other.78 “[T]he evolution of the idea of self
defense in international law goes hand in hand with the prohibition of aggression . . . . Self
defense as a legitimate recourse to force is inextricably linked to the antithesis of the employment
of unlawful force by . . . its opponent.”79 The use of force prohibition “necessarily implicates
and defines the countervailing permitted self defensive use of armed force as one which
encompasses the ability to defend against the use and the threat of armed force as well.”80 More
specifically, so far as “the traditional prohibition on the use of force is . . . jus cogens, the
integrity of the system, the maintenance of balance between the two components of the system,
mandate that its counterpart, the permissible use of armed force, be recognized as having that

II.B.2. Hence, this phrase is also not a limitation on the right of self-defense, but attempts to
define it. Scott, supra note 18, at 58.
76

See Kahgan, supra note 65, at 791.
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U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
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See Kahgan, supra note 65, at 791.
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DINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 174-75 (citing Report of the International Law Commission, 32nd
Sess., 1980 II (2) Int’l L. Comm’n Y.B. 1, 52).
80

Kahgan, supra note 65, at 791 (citing J.N. SINGH, USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
10 (1984)).
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same normative status.”81 It is widely accepted that this prohibition on the use of force rises to
the level of a jus cogens norm,82 and accordingly, the right to use defensive armed force must
also rise to the level of a jus cogens norm.

B. The Scope Of The Right Of Self-Defense
The concept of legal use of force in international law is commonly expressed as jus ad
bellum, or just war theory.83 Though Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the use
of force in international relations,84 Article 51 permits the use of force when an “armed attack”
has occurred.85 However, as noted earlier, it is not clear “whether the drafters of the Charter
intended to limit the pre-existing right to only cases of armed attack; [or] whether, as the
International Law Commission observed, the Charter merely ‘sets out to state the rule concerning
a particular case,’ but does not purport to limit all cases of self- defense.”86 This section will
81

Id.

82

See IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 222-23 (2d ed. 1984)
(“There is ample evidence for the proposition that, subject to the necessary exceptions about the
use of force in self-defence or under the authority of a competent organ of the United Nations or
a regional agency acting in accordance with the Charter, the use of armed or physical force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State is now prohibited. This
proposition is so central to the existence of any international legal order of individual nation
States (however nascent that international legal order may be) that it must be taken to have the
character of jus cogens.”). See also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J LEXIS 4 at *192 (June 27).
83

William V. O’Brien, Just-War Theory, in THE ETHICS OF WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 30
(James P. Sterba ed., 1985).
84

U.N. Charter art. 2(4).

85

Id. at art. 51.

86

Brennan, supra note 37, at 1200-01 (quoting Report of the International Law Commission to
the General Assembly, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 125-27, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980),
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explore areas where states’ use of force may be justified without prior Security Council
authorization.

1. Self-Defense If An Armed Attack Occurs
Although all states agree that there is a right to self-defense if an armed attack occurs, the
gravity of the action required to constitute an “armed attack” remains controversial.87 In
Nicaragua v. U.S., the International Court of Justicedefined “ armed attack” as:
not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also
"the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to" (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular
forces, "or its substantial involvement therein". This description, contained in
Article 3, paragraph (g), of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General
Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), may be taken to reflect customary
international law. The Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the
prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to
the territory of another State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects,
would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier
incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces.88
Thus, in order to use self-defense against a state, there must be some action imputable to
that state.89 However, the Court held that an “armed attack” does not include “assistance to
rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support,” even though such
assistance could be regarded as “a threat or use of force” or illegal intervention.90

reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l. L. Comm'n 58-59, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (part
2).
87

Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 44 (2002).
88

See id.

89

1986 I.C.J LEXIS 4 at *215-16 (June 27).

90

Id. at 216.
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Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the
concept of “armed attack” has become less clear.91 One of the most difficult questions is whether
the definition of an “armed attack” has been extended to allow self-defense against states
harboring terrorists.92 After 9/11, President George W. Bush announced that the United States
would make no distinction between terrorists and those who harbored them.93 The Joint
Resolution of Congress also authorized force against states which “planned, authorized,
committed or aided the terrorist attacks . . . or harbored such organizations.”94 To many, this was
a widening of the right of self-defense.95
In any case, if state involvement in a particular aggressive activity does not amount to an
“armed attack,” a state must still have the right to use necessary and proportionate force within
its inherent right to self-defense.96

91

See, e.g,, GRAY, supra note 1, at 166.

92

Id. at 165-66. Some commentators argue that it has not. See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, International
Law Under Fire: Terrorist Acts as “Armed Attack”: The Right to Self-Defense, Article 51 (1/2)
of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35, 50 (2003) (“The
mere fact that a state does not prevent terrorists from carrying out armed attacks against another
state will hardly suffice to allow action against that regime. The necessity test under Article 51
limits the possibility to justify measures of self-defense against a regime that fails to take
appropriate action against terrorists operating from its territory.”).
93

GRAY, supra note 1, at 165-66 (citing Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United
States relating to International Law, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. (2002) 237).
94

Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Those
Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong.
(2001).
95

GRAY, supra note 1, at 166. Another question that has become more controversial since 9/11 is
whether the definition of “armed attack” now includes attacks on nationals abroad. Id. at 167.

96

See Scott, supra note 18, at 51.
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2. Self-Defense Against State Action That Does Not Amount To An Armed
Attack
It has been suggested that the lawfulness of force used in self-defense should not be
determined by the form that the attack takes, but rather:
it is the seriousness of the threat to the security of a state, coupled with the
principles of necessity and proportionality, which should determine what level of
response is appropriate. It would be unfruitful to search for evidence in the
practice of states that refrain from exercising necessary action in “self-defense”
when their fundamental security concerns were imminently threatened, even in
situations short of an “armed attack.” . . . . If the term “armed attack” is to have
any role in these determinations, it must be given flexible interpretation to cover
all cases of fundamental threats to security . . . . Indeed, the principles of necessity
and proportionality, strictly applied, generate a basis upon which to determine
when armed response is legitimate.97
The right to self-defense is vitally necessary to the survival of any state. A “rigid
application of a categorical approach” to the right of self-defense would result in the “dangerous
(and absurd) legal conclusion that an armed response . . . against an illegal attack which does not,
however, meet the requirements of the category ‘armed attack,’ would be illegal under
international law.”98 Judge Jennings in Nicaragua advised against adopting such an
interpretation.99

97

Id. at 51-52.

98

Id. at 52.

99

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J 14, 543-44 (June 27)
(Jennings, , J., dissenting) (“This looks to me neither realistic nor just in the world where power
struggles are in every continent carried on by destabilization, interference in civil strife, comfort,
aid and encouragement to rebels, and the like. The original scheme of the United Nations
Charter, whereby force would be deployed by the United Nations itself, in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, has never come into effect. Therefore an essential
element in the Charter design is totally missing. In this situation it seems dangerous to define
unnecessarily strictly the conditions for lawful self-defence, so as to leave a large area where
both a forcible response to force is forbidden, and yet the United Nations employment of force,
which was intended to fill that gap, is absent.”).
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Aside from the suggested “armed attack” requirement, other criteria exist to determine
when the use of force in self-defense is justified. Hugo Grotius lists three such examples: (1) the
danger is immediate; (2) the defensive action is necessary to adequately defend the threatened
interests; and (3) the necessary defensive action is proportionate to the danger.100 The U.S.
Secretary of State Daniel Webster recognized these standards as customary international norms
during the resolution of the Caroline incident in 1842.101 Webster wrote that a legitimate claim
of self-defense requires a “necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no moment
for deliberation."102 If indeed Article 51 of the U.N. Charter preserves the well-rooted “inherent”
right of self-defense, and does not limit the right to instances where the aggression meets the
elusive definition of “armed attack,” these criteria could serve as an adequate basis for
determining when armed response is legitimate.103

a. Anticipatory Self-Defense
If, however, the requirements of immediacy, necessity and proportionality discussed
above must also be coupled with a requirement that a state actually suffer an armed attack, it
must follow that “it is not the first ‘armed attack’ that triggers the right of self-defense; on the
100

Motala, supra note 30, at 10 (citing HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE bk. II, ch.
1 (1949)).

101

Id. In the Caroline incident, the British burned and destroyed the U.S. steamship Caroline and
caused the death of several U.S. citizens while attempting to restrict the flow of supplies to rebels
in the Canadian region of Niagra Falls. The British government claimed self-defense. See id.
(citing BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1221-23 (1991)).
102

30 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 193 (1843), reprinted inJennings, The Caroline and
McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 89 (1938).
103

Scott, supra note 18, at 52 (citing ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 205 (1963); 2 A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (John B. Moore ed., 1906)).
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contrary, it is the imminent threat of the second attack that triggers such right.”104 This notion
begs the questions: (1) What is it about the first armed attack that opens the door to self-defense?
(2) If there is very credible evidence that a state is in danger of a first attack, and there is a
“necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no moment for deliberation,”105 why
should a state first suffer an armed attack, rather than protect itself from the imminent danger? If
a state were required to suffer an armed attack before the right to defend itself ripened, even
though the imminence of the first and second attacks were equal, it would necessarily follow that
the right to self-defense would have an intrinsic element of reprisal. Self-defense would not only
be about self-preservation, but would also be about getting back at the aggressor nation. But this
consequence would likely offend many of the commentators that support this notion.106
The better view is that the right to self-defense is based solely on the principle of selfpreservation, and therefore must extend to circumstances when a first attack is imminent.107 A
nation’s right of self-preservation should not be limited to armed responses to imminent second
attacks.108 This natural law principle has been recognized for centuries, at least back to the

104

Popiel, supra note 21, at ¶ 28.
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30 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 193 (1843), reprinted inJennings, The Caroline and
McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 89 (1938).
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See, e.g., Popiel, supra note 21, at ¶ 28-29 (“use of force under the right of self-defense does
not allow States to carryout retaliatory attacks”); GRAY, supra note 1, at 163; DINSTEIN, supra
note 15, at 174-75.
107

See GROTIUS, supra note 38, at 172.

108

See Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Use of Conventional International Law in Combating
Terrorism: A Maginot Line for Modern Civilization Employing the Principles of Anticipatory
Self-Defense & Preemption, 55 A.F. L. REV. 87, 111 (2004). Though the terms “anticipatory
self-defense” and “preemption” are most often used interchangeably, some commentators make
a distinction between the two. See, e.g., id. at 125 (“Where one state threatens another directly or
indirectly bu granting terrorist groups safe haven or other support, the anticipatory self-defense
doctrine may prove to be an acceptable response, provided the response meets the proportionality
21

writings of Grotius, who believed that nations should enjoy the same right that individuals enjoy:
that they may lawfully kill whoever is attempting to kill them.109 Many international scholars
define anticipatory self-defense within the confines of the criteria articulated in the Caroline
case, as “an entitlement to strike first when the danger posed is instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”110 In the 18th century, Swiss philosopher and
legal expert Emmerich de Vattel taught:
"The safest plan is to prevent evil, where that is possible. A nation has the right to
resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force and every other
just means of resistance against the aggressor. It may even anticipate the other's
design, being careful, however, not to act upon vague and doubtful suspicions, lest
it should run the risk of becoming itself the aggressor.111
Also, most international legal scholars agree that the right to anticipatory self-defense
existed before the U.N. Charter.112 Hence, if Article 51 of the U.N. Charter reserves the
“inherent” right of self-defense, that reservation includes the pre-Charter right to anticipatory
self-defense.113 A good example of the survival of this doctrine is the “Six Day War” between

and necessity tests. Likewise, where a state grants terrorist groups safe haven or offers other
support, the state may be subject to military attack through the preemption doctrine.”).
109

Id. (citing HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE ch. 1 (1625); see, e.g., Restatement
(Second) of Torts §65 (1965).
110

Kastenberg, supra note 108, at 111 (quoting Anthony d'Amato, Open Forum: Israel's Air
Strike Against the Osiraq Reactor: A Retrospective, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 259, 261
(1996) (citing Louis Rene Beres & Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel's Destruction of
Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 437, 438 (1995))).

111

EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, BOOK II (1758).
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E.g. Kastenberg, supra note 108, at 111-12 (citing ANTHONY CLARK & ROBERT J. BECK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 5 (1993))
(“[C]ustomary international law recognized a right to anticipatory self-defense long before
Article 51 existed.”).
113

See U.N. Charter art. 51.
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Israel on one side, and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other.114 Israel attacked targets in Egypt
after Egypt ordered U.N. peacekeepers out of the Gaza and Sinai regions that bordered Israel,
and ordered a massive military buildup to prepare an invasion into Israel.115 Egyptian and other
Arab officials also publicly announced their desire to “drive Israel into the sea.”116 Though
Egyptian forces had not yet crossed into Israel, an attack was imminent, and the Israeli response
was necessary and proportional.117 Consequently, though the Security Council never expressly
condoned Israel’s actions, international law scholars have rendered little serious criticism to
Israel’s anticipatory actions.118

114

Kastenberg, supra note 108, at 112. However, there are instances where claims of
anticipatory self-defense have been rejected by the international community, the General
Assembly, and the Security Council. For example, in 1981, Israeli aircraft destroyed an Iraqi
nuclear reactor capable of supplying fissile material for nuclear weapons. Id. at 97 (citing Lt.
Col. Uri Shoham, The Israeli Aerial Raid Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor and the Right of Self
Defense, 109 MIL. L. REV. 191, 191-208 (1985)). Israeli officials viewed the possibility of a
nuclear strike as a threat to Israel’s security. Id. Israel claimed self-defense, but its argument
was not well-accepted in the international community. Id. Also, the Security Council
condemned Israel’s attack as a clear violation of the U.N. Charter. Id; S.C. Res. 478, 36 U.N.
SCOR (2288th mtg.) (1981), U.N. Doc. S/Res/487 (1981).
115

Kastenberg, supra note 108, at 97 (CITING MICHAEL OREN, SIX DAYS OF WAR, JUNE 1967,
AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 36-67 (2002).
116

Id.

117

See id.
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Id. at 112; see, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97
A.J.I.L. 82, 88 (2003) (“the initiation of the Six-Day War by an Israeli air attack on Egyptian
airports was not condemned by the institutions of the international community. The relation that
prevailed between Egypt and Israel at the time may have already been one of belligerency, so that
the air attack could have been seen as anticipatory . . . self-defense. If a state of war exists, a
belligerent need not wait until its adversary strikes in order to respond militarily, but is entitled,
itself, to select the moment of initiation or resumption of overt conflict.”)
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After 9/11, it seems that the claim of anticipatory self-defense may become more
popular.119 Following the attacks, the United States letter to the Security Council said: “In
response to these attacks and in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective
self-defence, United States armed forces have initiated actions designed to prevent and deter
further attacks on the United States.”120 The United Kingdom letter said: “These forces have
been employed in exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence,
recognized in Article 51, following the terrorist outrage of 11 September, to avert the continuing
threat of attacks from the same source.”121

b. Reprisal/Retaliation
It is generally agreed that mere retaliatory use of force is unlawful because of the want of
the criteria of immediacy and necessity.122 The Restatement (Third) states:
The principle of necessity ordinarily precludes measures designed only as
retribution for a violation and not as an incentive to terminate a violation or to
remedy it. A state may retaliate, however, by acts of "retorsion"123 which are not
otherwise illegal . . . . Retorsion is to be distinguished from "reprisal";
traditionally, reprisal was punitive in character and commonly involved the use of
force, such as bombardment or temporary occupation of part of the offending
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Some see this as a “resurrection” of the anticipatory self-defense. See Michael J. Kelly, Time
Warp to 1945 – Resurrection of the Reprisal and Anticipatory Self-Defense Doctrines in
International Law, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 2-3.
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GRAY, supra note 1, at 171 (quoting UN Doc. S/2001/946).
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Id. (quoting UN Doc. S/2001/947).
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Id. at 121 (quoting UN Doc. S/2001/946).
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A retorsion differs from reprisal in that a retorsion uses legal means to coerce a state to
suspend an action, while a reprisal uses otherwise illegal means to accomplish the coercion.
Kelly, supra note 119, at 7 (citing EDWARD KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT: PERSONAL AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 130-31 (1992)).
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state's territory. To the extent that reprisal involves threat or use of force, its use is
now limited by the principles of the United Nations Charter.124
The Security Council also condemned reprisals as “incompatible with the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.”125
It is important to note, however, that some scholars accept armed reprisals as legitimate
so long as they are defensive and preventive.126 Yoram Dinstein states: “Armed reprisals do not
qualify as legitimate self-defense if they are impelled by purely punitive, non-defensive motives.
. . [A]rmed reprisals must be future-oriented, and not limited to a desire to punish past
transgressions.”127

c. Protection of Nationals
“It is generally accepted that Article 2(4) does not forbid limited use of force in the
territory of another state incidental to attempts to rescue persons whose lives are endangered
there.”128 Additionally, the Security Council has yet to condemn such a claim.129
The generally accepted conditions on the right to use force to protect nationals abroad
include: (a) there is an imminent threat of injury to the nationals; (b) the territorial sovereign fails
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Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §102(2) (1987).
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S.C. Res. 188, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., 1111th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/19/Rev.1 (1964).
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DINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 208.
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Id.
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Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §905 cmt. g. (1987).
GRAY, supra note 1, at 31. See also Derek W. Bowett, The Use of Force for the Protection of
Nationals, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 39 (Antonio Cassese, ed.
1986); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 203 (3d ed. 2001).
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GRAY, supra note 1, at 128.
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to or is unable to protect the nationals in question; and (c) the measures of protection are strictly
confined to the object of protecting the nationals against injury.130
In the Entebbe incident, for example, Palestinian terrorists hijacked a French airliner
enroute from Tel Aviv to Paris and diverted it to Uganda where six more terrorists were
waiting.131 After the terrorists freed all of the non-Israelis, the terrorists threatened the lives of
the Israelis.132

The government of Uganda was complacent and appeared to be supporting the

terrorist action.133 In response, Israeli commandos stormed the Entebbe Airport and killed the
terrorists.134 Its actions were limited to the rescue of its nationals.135 Israel justified its actions
to the Security Council, claiming that it had the right to take action to protect its nationals, and
that this right was based on the inherent right of self-defense that is rooted in international law,
preserved by the U.N. Charter, and supported by state practice.136 Israel also claimed that its use
of force to protect its nationals was consistent with the Caroline standards of immediacy,
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Id. (citing Geoffrey Marston, Armed Intervention in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis: the Legal
Advice tendered to the British Government, 31 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 773, 795, 800).
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Thomas C. Wingfield, Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad, 104 DICK. L. REV. 439, 453
(2000) (citing NATALINO RONZITTI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY
COERCION AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 37 (1985)).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. (citing ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 99 (1993)).
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Wingfield, supra note 131, at 453 (citing RONZITTI, supra note 131, at 37).
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necessity, and proportionality.137 Though the Security Council never expressly condoned the
action, the United States and France both supported the Israeli action.138

3. Right To Self-Defense Once The Security Council Takes Action
Not only is it difficult to determine when there is a legitimate right to use force in selfdefense, it is also difficult to determine how long that right lasts. Article 51 states that the right
to self-defense continues “until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.”139 There is difficulty, however, in determining: (1) who
decides whether the Security Council has taken “necessary” measures, and (2) what are the
appropriate measures that terminate the right to unilateral use of force in self-defense.
As for the first question of who decides whether the Security Council’s actions abrogate
the right to use force in self-defense, some commentators hold that, “[g]iven that the UN Charter
aims not only to limit, but also to centralize, the use of force under UN control, it seems clear that
the intention was to give the Security Council itself the right to decide whether such measures
terminating the right to self-defense have been taken.”140 However, this view is problematic
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Id.
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See U.N. Doc. S/PV 1941 (1976); U.N. Doc. S/PV 1443, at 28-30, 31 (1976). Some
commentators have also accepted as legitimate the use of force to rescue hostages and have
referred to this action as the “Entebbe Principal.” See Louis Henkin, Conceptualizing Violence:
Present and Future Developments in International Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 571, 572 (1997) (“The
‘Entebbe Principle’ would permit a state to penetrate the territory another state for the sole,
temporary, ad hoc purpose of liberating hostages.”).
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U.N. Charter art. 51.
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GRAY, supra note 1, at 104.
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because if the right of self-defense has acquired the status of a jus cogens norm, from which no
derogation is permitted, then it cannot be suspended merely by passing a resolution.141
Other commentators take the position that the state should determine whether the actions
of the Security Council are sufficient to maintain international peace and security.142 But this
position is also problematic because “such auto-interpretation of the adequacy of Security
Council measures by the state (or states) in question would vitiate the system contemplated by
the Charter of collective security under the aegis of the Security Council.”143
Hence, the better view is that the Security Council must make the determination as to
whether its actions are sufficient to abrogate the right to use defensive force, but it must be based
on objective criteria.144 That way, if a state disobeys a Security Councilheed to discontinue its
aggression and withdraw forces, the victim state would not be required to “fold his arms and
allow the aggressor to continue his aggression and to digest its fruits.”145 The Security Council
could not abrogate the state’s right to self-defense until it could objectively justify its
determination that its actions constituted “measures necessary to maintain international peace and
141

Scott, supra note 18, at 62 (citing Moore, supra note 18, at 154).
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Malvina Halberstam, The Right to Self-Defense once the Security Council Takes Action, 17
MICH. J. INT’L L. 229, 244 (citing KELSEN, supra note 15, at 800).
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Scott, supra note 18, at 61 (citing BOWETT, supra note 18, at 196).
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Id. There is support for this in state practice. Id at 63. For example, when Argentina invaded
the Falkland islands in 1982, the United Kingdom argued that the determination of whether
Security Council actions were sufficient to terminate its right to use defensive force must be
“reached in light of all the relevant circumstances.” Id. at 64 (quoting Provisional Verbatim
Record, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., 2362 mtg. at 103, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2362 (1982)). Argentina
similarly said that “[t]he determination of whether such measures have been effective must be
reached objectively and cannot be left to the arbitrary judgment of the . . . United Kingdom.” Id.
at 65.
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Id. (citing Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., 2362d mtg. at 103, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.2362 (1982)).
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security.”146 The criteria used would also provide the International Court of Justice with the
information necessary to review the conflict and to make an objective determination on the issue.
The second question of what measures are appropriate to terminate the right to unilateral
use of defensive force is even more difficult. Though some commentators opine that states may
lose the right of self-defense once the Security Council becomes involved, regardless of the
success and sufficiency of the Security Council action,147 the better view is thatthe U.N. Charter
should not be interpreted as terminating the right of self-defense at any time before the Security
Council has taken the measures “necessary” to control the conflict.148 This interpretation is
overwhelmingly confirmed by Article 51’s legislative history,149 and is even more poignant
when considering the weakness of the Security Council:
It is difficult to believe that some 180 states would have agreed to give up the most
fundamental attribute of sovereignty, the right to use force in self-defense, to an
international body, and particularly one like the Security Council. The Security
Council decides on the basis of the political interests of the states voting - the state
attacked may not even have a vote. It is inconceivable that they would have done
so in language that affirms the "inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence."150
“The Charter has provided that Members of the United Nations, when complying with its
principles and purposes, should not be left in a defenceless state against any act of aggression
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Halberstam, supra note 142, at 231.
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Id. at 248.
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perpetrated against its territory or population.”151 Such a situation would be in derogation of jus
cogens.152 Under Article 51, “measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security”153 “must mean at a minimum the use of armed force, the imposition of economic
sanctions, or both,”154 because only then is unilateral defensive action no longer “necessary” to
adequately defend the threatened interests.155 Anything less cannot be thought to abrogate the
right of self-defense because this could force an innocent state to suffer continuing victimization
from a non-compliant aggressor.156
One of the most famous examples of this controversy is the Falkland Islands crisis in
1982. After Argentina invaded the United Kingdom colonial territory, the Security Council in
Resolution 502 condemned the action and determined that there had been a breach of peace.157
The Council demanded an immediate cessation of the hostilities and withdrawal of Argentine
forces, and called on Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution.158
Though Argentina argued that Resolution 502 suspended the United Kingdom’s right to self-
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defense,159 the U.K. argued that its inherent right of self-defense was not impaired by the
resolution because it was not effective—Argentina had not withdrawn its forces.160 Both nations
urged the Security Council to use an objective test to determine whether its actions could
constitute “measures necessary” to terminate the United Kingdom’s right to self-defense.161
Though no express announcement had been made, the United Kingdom had the better position:
that the resolution could not “by itself be a sufficient alternative to the victim state’s right to meet
and repulse the aggression.”162

4. Self-Defense In Domestic Matters
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter is a prohibition on the “use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state.”163 Accordingly, internal conflicts such as civil
wars are seen as domestic matters, “except in so far as they might constitute a threat to
international peace and security.”164 It is sufficient for the present purposes to say that it is clear

159

See Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., 2360th mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.2360 (1982) (“It is known that under Article 51 of the Charter unilateral actions must cease
when the Security Council has already taken measures. There is a legal obligation to suspend
self-defence once the Security Council ‘has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.’ The determination of whether such measures have been effective must be
reached objectively and cannot be left to the arbitrary judgment of the Government of the United
Kingdom itself.”).
160

See Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess. At 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/1517 (Readex 1982).
161

Scott, supra note 18, at 66.

162

MCCOUBREY, supra note 154, at 101.

163

U.N. Charter art. 2(4).

164

GRAY, supra note 1, at 59.

31

that states also have the right to use force to defend themselves against threats within their own
borders, though Article 51 does not directly govern such matters.165

III. MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGOES
The Security Council has the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security.”166 In order to accomplish this goal, “[t]he Security Council may decide
what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations,” which includes
prohibitions on the shipment of arms.167 A Security Council mandated provision, such as an
arms embargo, creates a legal obligation on all United Nations members to comply.168
An imposition of a U.N. arms embargo on a country requires the affirmative vote from all
five of the permanent members (rule of “great power unanimity” or “veto” power), and at least
four votes from the remaining ten countries.169 None of the non-permanent members have
authority to veto a Security Council decision.170
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Arms embargoes are one of the most powerful tools available for international
peacekeeping.171 “By denying aggressors and human rights abusers the implements of war and
repression, arms embargoes contribute directly to preventing and reducing the level of armed
conflict.”172 Additionally, “in constricting only selected weapons and military-related goods and
services, and in denying these to ruling elites, their armies, and other violent combatants, arms
embargoes constitute the quintessential example of a smart sanction.”173 They are an important
contributor to the protection of innocent civilians.174 Perhaps this is why the Security Council
imposes arms embargoes more frequently than any other type of economic sanction.175
In addition to Security Council mandated arms embargoes, these sanctions are also often
imposed by regional organizations, such as the European Union and the Economic Community of
West African States, and by individual countries.176 The United States alone has unilaterally
imposed arms restrictions against dozens of countries in recent years.177 These unilateral arms
embargoes often remain in place, even after U.N. arms embargoes are lifted.178
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However, while any state is free to choose to deny the supply of arms to another state, it
has occasionally been argued that a mandatory arms embargo imposed by the Security Council
may interfere with a nation’s right to self-defense.179 The following section provides a nonexhaustive, but representative sample of this argument.

A. Past Arguments
1. South Africa
The first time this argument was used was in 1977 when the Security Council adopted
Resolution 418 imposing a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa.180 After the Nationalist
party assumed power in South Africa in 1948, legislation passed that would form the pillars of
the apartheid system, restricting the rights of blacks and other minorities.181 The United Nations
General Assembly called on U.N. members to break diplomatic relations with and boycott
against South Africa in Resolution 1761 on November 6, 1962.182 Then on August 7, 1963, the
U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 181, recommending a non-mandatory arms embargo
against Africa.183 The United Kingdom and France both stated that they would distinguish
between weapons for internal suppression and external defense, and also (along with the United
179
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States) opposed a mandatory arms embargo.184 But, in 1976, hundreds of blacks were killed in
riots in the township of Soweto during a protest against inequities in the educational system,
which sparked an intensification of international condemnation of the apartheid regime.185 Also,
in September 1977, the leader of the Black Consciousness movement, Stephen Biko, died in
police custody.186 Finally, on November 4, 1977, primarily as a result of Sowet riots, subsequent
disturbances and repression in South Africa, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 418
which declared arms trade with South Africa a “threat to peace” and made the arms embargo
mandatory.187 The representative of France said that no country could be denied the right of selfdefense as provided in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.188 But, because the intention of the arms
embargo was to protest against the stockpiling of weapons intended for purposes of internal
repression, especially in the aftermath of the recent crackdown by the South African
Government, the French Government decided to vote in favor of a mandatory embargo on arms
shipments to South Africa.189 The Security Council did not lift the mandatory arms embargo
until Nelson Mandela was elected president in 1994.190
184
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2. Yugoslavia
The most profound example of a state claiming that an arms embargo violates its inherent
right to self-defense is that of Bosnia-Herzegovina.191 In late 1991, four of the six republics of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia declared their independence, including Croatia,
Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.192 These declarations of independence were
opposed by the Serbian members of the former Yugoslav national government and pro-Serbian
elements of the Yugoslav People’s Army (“JNA”).193 The elements of the JNA had retained
almost all of the arms it had maintained as the armed forces of Yugoslavia, and invaded Slovenia
almost immediately to try to reverse its expression of independence.194 Croatia shortly became
involved in the conflict.195 As the violence escalated, representatives of the European
Community (“E.C.”) tried to negotiate a diplomatic solution, but failed.196 “Brokered cease-fires
were routinely violated by the parties, who probably viewed the legitimacy of E.C. diplomatic
intervention with skepticism.”197
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After almost three months of conflict, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 713,
imposing a mandatory arms embargo on the states of former Yugoslavia.198 However, this did
not put an end to the aggression. Ethnic Serbs within Bosnia, supported by Slobodan Milosevic
and the Serbian government, began attacking Muslims and Croats.199 It seemed that Serbia
wanted to “ethnically cleanse” Bosnia-Herzegovina of Muslims and Croats, and ultimately link
the Serbia-controlled area to a greater Serbia.200 The Muslim and Croat population (who were
the numerical majority) became victims of aggression, torture, detention, and mass rape.201
Many of them were killed or put into concentration camps.202 The General Assembly recognized
Serbia’s actions as genocidal in nature.203
Serbia’s aggression triggered Bosnia’s legal right to use force in self-defense. Even if an
armed attack were required to trigger that right, the Serbian mass killing of Muslims and Croats
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would easily fit into the strictest definition of an armed attack.204 The threat was immediate, and
armed response was necessary to protect against the aggression.205
Furthermore, the Security Council’s imposition of a mandatory arms embargo could not
conceivably be considered a measure “necessary to maintain international peace and security.”206
On the contrary, the embargo “effectively sanctioned a situation where an aggressor state (and its
paramilitary allies) could overrun a weaker victim state.”207 The Security Council’s action did
not make a Bosnian armed response unnecessary, and hence, it did not abrogate Bosnia’s right to
self-defense.208 In reality, the arms embargo made it all but impossible for Bosnia to exercise
that legal right.
Because the right to self-defense is a jus cogens norm, and because the mandatory arms
embargo was interfering with that right, it follows that the maintenance of the embargo was in
conflict with international law.209
The U.N. recognized Bosnia as a sovereign state on May 22, 1992, following the
European Community’s recognition on April 6, 1992.210 As the world gained knowledge of the
Serbian atrocities, individual countries increasingly called for the arms embargo to be lifted.211
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This eventually led to the General Assembly’s adoption of Resolution 47/121, urging the
Security Council to lift the embargo.212 However, the Security Council did not lift the embargo
as applied to Bosnia, even though the U.N. identified Serbia as the chief aggressor in the
conflict.213
The embargo against Bosnia was not lifted until November 22, 1995,214 and “was not
based on Bosnia’s right to self-defense, but was instead contingent on the Croat, Bosnian and
Serb leadership signing the Dayton Peace Agreement initialed by the respective leaders in
Dayton, Ohio, on November 22, 1995.”215
Bosnia attempted to persuade the International Court of Justice to consider the legality of
the arms embargo imposed against it, and “clarify the legal situation for the entire international
community.”216 Specifically, Bosnia wanted to know whether its right to self- defense, including
the means (arms), prevailed over a Security Council mandated arms embargo.217 However, the
Court determined it lacked the jurisdiction to rule on the issue because the states that issued the
embargoes were not parties to the case.218
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3. Rwanda
The argument surfaced again with regard to the conflict in Rwanda.219 Before 1994,
Rwanda was one of the most densely populated countries in the world. Its population consisted
of two major ethnic groups: The Hutus accounted for 85 percent of the population, and the Tutsis
comprised about 14 percent of the population.220 Although the Hutus were the numerical
majority, the Tutsis had ruled over the Hutus for the last half of a millennium221 until 1961. In
1973, General Habyarimana (a Hutu) gained power in a military coup and ruled for the next
twenty years.222 During the years leading up to the massacre, the Habyarimana government
promoted ethnic hatred within Rwanda.223 “The floodgate of ethnic hatred opened on April 6,
1994, when Habyarimana’s airplane was shot down as he was returning from a regional peace
summit in Dar es Salaam. His death set off a chain reaction of indiscriminate killing of Tutsis

it could have compromised Bosnia’s “already precarious political position at the peace
negotiations, the success of which depended in significant measure on the role played by the
United Kingdom.” Id. Ultimately, Bosnia decided not to include any arguments related to the
arms embargo in its Memorial on the merits, especially after the cool reception that the majority
of the Court gave the arms embargo at the Provisional Measures stages. Id at 13. It seems that
Bosnia decided that its best course of action would be to “secure a Court judgment that Serbia
ha[d] violated the Genocide Convention and not to cloud the Court’s inquiry with the
controversial and jurisdictionally uncertain issue of the arms embargo.” Id.
219

GRAY, supra note 1, at 107.

220

Ved P. Nanda et al., Tragedies In Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and Liberia—
Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law—Part II, 26
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 827, 847 (1998) (citing U.S. Agency for International Development,
Rwanda - Civil Strife/ Displaced Persons 1 (Situation Report No. 4, 1994)).
221

Id. (citing JASON A. DZUBOW, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO CIVIL WAR IN RWANDA 513
(1994)).
222

Id. at 847-48.

223

Id .at 847.

40

and Hutu opposition members led by the Presidential Guard.” 224 In just over three months,
between 500,000 and 800,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutsis, were killed.225 The U.N. had previously
deployed battalions in an attempt to bring peace to the region, but had failed.226 The deeper the
crisis became, the more the U.N. Members’ support faltered.227
A month into the genocide, the Security Council passed Resolution 918 imposing an
arms embargo on Rwanda to try to prevent the escalation of violence, and expanding the number
of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (“UNAMIR”) forces from 1,515 to 5,500.228
However, the deployment of the additional forces was drastically delayed due to the
unwillingness of Member States to contribute troops and equipment.229 After gaining control, the
Rwandese Patriotic Front (“RPF”), comprising Tutsis who had earlier fled from Rwanda,
established a government with a broad representative base.230
The severe internal conflict had made Rwanda vulnerable to outside interference.231
Accordingly, Rwanda pursued a similar line of argument as that of Bosnia, that the arms
embargo should be lifted to allow the country to protect itself against an outside threat.232 “This
time the Security Council did respond, noting with concern the reports of military preparations
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and incursions into Rwanda by supporters of the former government.”233 Though Rwanda had
not yet suffered an “armed attack,” there was an immediate threat, and armed response would be
necessary if the threat materialized.234 Further, because the U.N. could not provide sufficient
forces or pressure to protect Rwanda from an outside attack, its action did not amount to
“measures necessary to maintain international peace and security,”235 and therefore it did not
abrogate Rwanda’s right to defend itself from the threat.236 Maintenance of the arms embargo
against the legitimate government would be in violation of jus cogens.237
Recalling that the original purpose of the mandatory embargo on the delivery of arms was
to prevent the massacre of innocent citizens, the Security Council responded by lifting the arms
embargo as applied to arms destined for the government,238 thereby allowing Rwanda to exercise
its right of self-defense should the outside threat materialize.

4. Sierra Leone
The issue arose again with respect to the arms embargo imposed against Sierra Leone.
The rebels of Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”) began in 1991 and attempted to introduce
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themselves as the new power in Sierra Leone.239 The military government of Sierra Leone hired
Executive Outcomes (“EO”), “a private South African mercenary outfit consisting of former
Apartheid troops, to fight the rebels” in 1991.240 “With experience gained from fighting South
Africa’s wars in Angola and Namibia, EO checked the RUF’s advance and in less than a month
had nearly cleared them from the country.”241 By 1996, the EO had forced the RUF into peace
negotiations.242 The RUF was to register as a political party and disarm.243 However, the RUF
did not disarm or demobilize, and overthrew the civilian administration of President Habbah in
May 1997 and assumed power.244 Since 1991, the RUF had claimed more than 75,000 lives,
caused half a million refugees, internally displaced 2.25 million people, and left thousands of
mutilated people.245 In October of 1997, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on
Sierra Leone.246 Some U.N. Member states attempted to defend the supply of arms to the
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legitimate government to allow it to defend itself, claiming that the embargo applied only to the
RUF.247 However, this distinction was not expressed in the Resolution.248
Because the RUF posed a threat to Sierra Leone’s legitimate government, Sierra Leone
had the right to defend itself against the threat.249 The threat was immediate, and armed response
was necessary to protect against the RUF aggression.250 Additionally, the U.N. had not taken any
action that could amount to “measures necessary” to maintain the peace, and hence Sierra
Leone’s right to use defensive force could not be abrogated. Maintenance of the arms embargo
against the legitimate government would be in violation of jus cogens.251 Accordingly, the
Security Council again responded by allowing arms to be supplied to the legitimate
government.252
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5. Liberia
Liberia also attempted to argue that the embargo imposed against it was unlawful as it
denied its right to self-defense, but in this instance the situation was quite different because the
government of Liberia itself posed a threat to international security.253 The U.N. Security
Council imposed an arms embargo against Liberia in Resolution 1343 as a sanction for the
country’s continuing illegal intervention in the Sierra Leone conflict.254 It was intended to stop
Liberia’s support of the RUF rebels.255 When Liberia was later attacked by Liberians United for
a Reconciliation and Democracy (“LURD”) within its own borders, it urged the Security Council
to lift the embargo, claiming that the embargo denied its right to defend itself.256 Although
Liberia did have the legal right to use armed force to resist the attacks,257 the Security Council
did not accept the argument, likely because the embargo continued to be effective in
accomplishing its purpose of ceasing Liberia’s support of the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone.258

6. Somalia
Perhaps the most recent attempt to lift a Security Council arms embargo based on the
right of self-defense is that of Somalia. The arms embargo in Somalia was imposed in 1992259
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in an attempt to establish peace after civil war broke out in 1991 when President Mohammed
Siad Barre was ousted by nationalist guerillas.260 Though U.N. peacekeepers were deployed,
success was impeded by heavily armed militant factions, and the peacekeepers were eventually
withdrawn completely.261
Since then, there have been continuing difficulties in establishing a government because
militias refuse to recognize new officials and continue their attacks.262 Finally, in September
2004, a 275-member parliament was convened (in Kenya) under a new charter, and Abdullahi
Yusuf Ahmed, a former general who had served as president of Puntland, was elected as
president in October 2004.263
The new government was slow to move to Somalia because there were disputes over who
would be in the cabinet, whether neighboring nations would contribute troops to African Union
peacekeeping forces, and where the government would be established.264 These disputes
produced fighting in Somalia in March and May of 2005, when two warlords battled for control
of Baidoa, one of the proposed temporary capitals.265 After returning to his home region of
Puntland, the president announced in July 2005 that he planned to move south to Jowhar, the
other proposed temporary capital.266 The president made the move, even though a coalition of
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Mogadishu warlords announced that they would attack Jowhar if the president tried to establish
a temporary capital there.267
In December 2005, the leaders of Somalia, along with the leaders of Yemen, Sudan and
Ethiopia, urged the Security Council to lift the embargo to help the transitional government
establish its authority over feuding warlords.268 It has been reported that many Somali warlords,
including ministers in the administration, have been purchasing shipments of weapons in case
fighting breaks out.269
However, because Yusuf and his government may themselves pose a threat to
international security if they procure arms, the Security Council will likely not lift the embargo
in this case, even as applied to arms destined for the government.270 While Yusuf was president
of Puntland, political problems were often solved by turning to arms.271 He also participated in
the ousting of Barre in 1991.272 Many see him as a war criminal and a dictator, and fear that he
will destabilize Somaliland if he is able to procure arms.273
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B. Discussion On Mandatory Arms Embargoes In Relation To The Right Of SelfDefense
A discussion of the legality of mandatory arms embargoes in light of the right to selfdefense first requires a recognition that Security Council resolutions are entitled to a presumption
of validity.274 The International Court of Justice has definitively stated that “[a] resolution of a
properly constituted organ of the United Nations which is passed in accordance with that organ’s
rules of procedure, and is declared by its President to have been so passed, must be presumed to
have been validly adopted.”275 However, the presumption is not irrebuttable.276
An analysis of the legality and validity of a mandatory arms embargo against a legitimate
claim of self-defense may turn on whether the current right of self-defense is: (1) governed solely
by Article 51 and its customary international law history; or (2) the right rises to the level of a
peremptory norm (jus cogens) from which no derogation is permitted.277
Article 103 of the U.N. Charter provides that “[i]n the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail.”278 Therefore, the obligations created by the Security Council under the authority
granted by the Charter, including mandatory arms embargoes imposed under the authority
274
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granted in Article 41,279 would seem to prevail over the nation’s right to self-defense. This
would likely be true if the right to self-defense did not rise to the level of jus cogens.
However, “[t]he status of jus cogens norms as a body of law superior to . . . customary
international law . . . requires, as a matter of the hierarchy of legal norms . . . that Article 103
provides no relief where Council conduct conflicts with jus cogens.”280 “It is not to be
contemplated that the Security Council would ever deliberately adopt a resolution clearly and
deliberately flouting a rule of jus cogens . . . . But the possibility that a Security Council
resolution might inadvertently or in an unseen manner lead to such a situation cannot be
excluded.”281 As discussed, a nation’s right to protect itselfrise s to the level of jus cogens,282 and
accordingly, the Security Council may not derogate from it by passing a resolution.283
The question remains, however, whether a mandatory arms embargo is in “derogation”
of a state’s valid claim of the right to self-defense. Some commentators suggest that:
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[t]o the extent that this inherent right of self-defense is a peremptory norm, not
even the Security Council can institute mandatory measures such as an arms
embargo, imposed on all the reputed parties to an ongoing armed conflict, as such
effectively undermines the ability of a victim state to engage in self-defense and,
thereby, prevents a state from availing itself of that right.284
Others argue that “an arms embargo may affect the right to self-defence but does not
actually deny that right.”285 In other words, in the face of a mandatory arms embargo, a nation
may continue to legally use armed force to protect itself—the embargo does not deny that right,
even though it may be affected by the inability to procure additional arms from other nations.286
An evaluation of the meaning of the word “derogation” is necessary to determine which
view is most appropriate. There has been little discussion in the International Court of Justice or
elsewhere with respect to what constitutes “derogation” in the context of a jus cogens norm.
Webster’s dictionary defines derogation as: “partly repealing, or lessening in value.”287 Thus, a
complete denial of a right is not required before there has been a derogation; on the contrary, an
action that affects a jus cogens norm, such as the right of self-defense, arguably is in
“derogation” of jus cogens, and hence is unlawful, at least in situations when the subject nation
does not pose a threat to international security and is otherwise in compliance with international
law. The embargo will continue to be in derogation “until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”288
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There is substantial evidence for this interpretation among commentators.289 There is also
substantial evidence of this interpretation among individual nations, such as when the United
States, Russia and Great Britain suggested lifting the embargo against Bosnia in order to allow it
to exercise its inherent right of self-defense.290 There is also acceptance of this interpretation
among the General Assembly as a whole as demonstrated by General Assembly Resolution
47/121, which urged the Security Council to lift the embargo imposed against Bosnia.291 There
seems to also be an acknowledgement of this interpretation by the Security Council after the
Bosnian conflict. Since then, Rwanda and Sierra Leone both argued that the arms embargo was
affecting their inherent right of self-defense, and the Security Council responded both times by
lifting the embargoes as applied to arms destined for the government.292 And finally, at least one
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member of the International Court of Justice seems to recognize this interpretation as expressed
in Judge Lauterpacht’s separate opinion in Bosnia v. Serbia II.293
It does seem, however, that the situation is quite different when the embargo is imposed
against a government that poses a threat to international security.294 In such instances, a valid
claim of self-defense may not prevail over the embargo. For example, the embargo against
Liberia was imposed to sanction its continuing illegal support of the RUF rebels in the Sierra
Leone conflict.295 When Liberia was later attacked by LURD rebels and asked the Security
Council to lift the embargo, claiming that it was a denial of the right of self- defense, this time the
Council did not respond, likely because the embargo was still fulfilling its purpose of preventing
Liberia’s continuing violations of international law.296 Likewise, in Somalia, president Yusuf
and his administration may pose a threat to international security if they procure additional arms,
and hence the Security Council will likely refuse to lift or adjust the embargo imposed against
it.297
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C. Implications Of Unlawful Maintenance Of An Arms Embargo
If a mandatory arms embargo derogates from jus cogens due to a legitimate claim of selfdefense, are Member states then free to disregard it? This view has been suggested by some
commentators:
[B]inding measures imposed by the Security Council that interfere with a victim
state’s inherent right to engage in armed self-defense . . . violates jus cogens.
Such measures are nullities which no state can be compelled to comply with,
without itself engaging in an agreement and acts that violate the most widely
recognized and fundamental peremptory norm for the maintenance of world
order.298
However, such a defiant response to an inadvertent situation would do little to contribute to
international peace and security, and would do much to promote anarchy. Consider the statement
made by then United States Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott regarding the embargo
against Bosnia:
We were convinced at the time, and remain convinced now, that unilateral lift
would have been a disaster. It would have put the United States in direct violation
of a binding U.N. Security Council Resolution. It would have encouraged others
to pick and choose the resolutions they would abide by, such as sanctions against
Saddam Hussein.299
The better view is that the individual states should not make the determination as to
whether to comply with the embargo. Such action could only do more harm than good. They
should honor the embargo until lifted. However, the Security Council should be cognizant of the
precarious position in which an innocent nation could find itself in the face of a mandatory arms
embargo, and adjust the embargo as necessary. It seems that this is what is taking place, such as

298
299

See Kahgan, supra note 65, at 825.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (May 23, 1996).

53

when the Security Council adjusted the embargoes imposed against both Rwanda and Sierra
Leone, allowing shipment of arms destined for the government.300
If the Security Council does not adjust an unlawful embargo as appropriate, then the
International Court of Justice should be prepared to hear arguments from both the subject nation
and the Security Council and make a determination. Although such a process would probably be
too lengthy to be helpful in the particular case, it would create helpful guidelines for similar
subsequent conflicts.301 Because the Court’s determinations play an important role in the
establishment and interpretation of international law, a determination on this issue would provide
much needed clarification. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the Court, “the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations, to resolve any legal questions that may be in issue between
parties to a dispute; and the resolution of such legal questions by the Court may be an important,
and sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful settlement of the dispute.”302

D. Competing Policy
There are important policies to consider when arguing that the maintenance of an arms
embargo is depriving a nation of its inherent right to self-defense. One commentator, Christene
Gray, has said:
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If every arms embargo is automatically inconsistent with Article 51 this would
restrict the Security Council’s discretion to take measures under Article 41303 and
deprive it of a useful tool to put pressure on a wrongdoing state or to try to limit
the escalation of a conflict. All states subject to an arms embargo could claim that
their rights under the Charter prevailed over the arms embargo.304
The argument set forth here, of course, is not that every embargo is automatically
inconsistent with Article 51, but that some embargoes, in some instances, might be.
Furthermore, a nation that is guilty of some “wrongdoing” would have extreme difficulty
persuading the Security Council, or anybody else for that matter, that their right to self-defense is
being affected.305
However, if an innocent government’s right to defend itself is unduly affected by the
maintenance of a mandatory arms embargo, the Security Council ought to adjust the embargo to
allow the innocent government to defend itself. This solution does not set a “dangerous
precedent and one that would undermine the freedom of the Security Council to maintain an arms
embargo” as Christene Gray suggests.306 On the contrary, it assists the Security Council to
perform its central duty of maintaining international peace and security307 and does not in any
way affect the Council’s freedom to maintain arms embargoes against “wrongdoing” states.

IV. CONCLUSION
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Article 51 preserves the “inherent” right of self-defense developed through customary
international law and rooted in natural law. 308 Accordingly, states are permitted to use armed
force to defend themselves against any threat of wrongful force without themselves being in
violation of international law. This right of self-preservation ripens immediately in the face of an
imminent threat, regardless of whether a previous attack has occurred, and regardless of whether
any previous attack met the elusive definition of an “armed attack.”309 A nation’s right to use
armed force in self-defense only disappears once the necessity for armed response disappears,
such as when the Security Council “takes measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security,”310 or the threat evaporates.
Because the prohibition on the wrongful use of force articulated in Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter rises to the level of a jus cogens norm, its counterpart, the right to defend against
the wrongful use of force, also rises to that level.311 As a jus cogens norm, the right to selfdefense may not be unduly affected, as this would be an impermissible derogation of a jus cogens
norm. So far as a mandatory arms embargo conflicts with a legitimate right to use defensive
armed force, the embargo must be adjusted to permit a nation to exercise the right.312
Because mandatory arms embargoes are an extremely effective tool to assist the Security
Council in performing its central responsibility of maintaining international peace and security,
the Council must have the ability to impose such embargoes against nations that pose a threat to
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international security.313 However, the Council can best perform its central function if it is
careful to protect legitimate claims of self-defense by adjusting embargoes as applied to arms
destined for innocent governments, while at the same time maintaining embargoes against
nations and governments that continually violate international law and pose a threat to peace.314
In situations where a mandatory arms embargo unduly deprives a nation of its right to
self-preservation, it is the Security Council, and not individual nations, that should act to remedy
the circumstance.315 If the Council fails to do so, then the responsibility lies with the
International Court of Justice to resolve the legal questions and provide clarification and
workable guidelines to prevent recurrence and the regrettable consequences that follow.316
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